Re: [Corpora-List] ANC, FROWN, Fuzzy Logic

From: Mark P. Line (mark@polymathix.com)
Date: Wed Jul 26 2006 - 22:29:08 MET DST

  • Next message: Mike Maxwell: "Re: [Corpora-List] ANC, FROWN, Fuzzy Logic"

    Peter Kühnlein wrote:
    > Mark P. Line wrote:
    >
    >>I would have to disagree. I think science is defined not by a search for
    >>truth but by use of scientific method.
    >>
    > Mark, may I ask, then, what constitutes the "scientific method"?
    > Isn't it the search for true propositions about nature?

    First, I should note that I didn't say "the scientific method". I don't
    actually believe that there's a single description that does justice to
    scientific method in all domains. "Objectively repeatable construction of
    useful models" is about as close as I can come to a common denominator.

    Some people, even practicing scientists, do in fact believe that science
    is the search for truth. But I see no evidence that such belief is
    necessary to do science. I can't take credit for the idea, though -- I've
    chosen to follow the thinking of Bas van Fraassen because it makes more
    sense to me (in an Ockhamesque kind of way) than that of competing
    notions.

    van Fraassen holds that science is not the search for true propositions
    about nature, or rather that "truth" is simply irrelevant in science. He
    holds instead that science is the search for useful models of nature.

    I think the search for true propositions about nature is part of
    philosophy, including theology, but not science.

    > I mean: you got
    > questions and want to have true answers to those questions. There are
    > ways of obtaining those answers that are acknowledged in some community.

    No there aren't. *shrug*

    As you recognize below, we have no way of knowing for sure that an answer
    is "true". So scientific communities of practice are actually providing
    ways of obtaining _useful_ answers, not ways of obtaining "true" answers.
    Right?

    >>[T]here are
    >>good epistemological reasons for failing to assume we'd know the "truth"
    >>for sure when we saw it.
    >>
    > That's right for sure: we might fail to know that an answer is true when
    > we get it. But we will want to know.

    I don't think that wanting to know the truth is necessary for the practice
    of science. It certainly helps to motivate scientists, though, as well as
    theologians and other philosophers. There are lots of things I'd love to
    know. What happens after I die? Is there an anthropomorphic supreme being,
    or is Taoist philosophy closer to the truth?

    Van Fraassen isn't saying you have to avoid philosophical or theological
    inquiry about "truth". He's just saying that such inquiry is not a
    necessary part of science.

    > Not having questions to be answered would make sciences a childs game,
    > playing around with elaborate toys following rules.

    I didn't say anything about not having questions to be answered. I said
    something about needing to believe that the answers are true.

    What difference does it make to you scientifically (as opposed to
    philosophically) whether or not there are elementary particles that move
    backwards through time as long as your DVD player works?

    > And, Mark: success of a theory might be a hint that it's true.

    Lots of theories are successful until they're replaced by later theories.
    So, even if the success of each theory in the sequence might be a hint
    that it's true, I don't think that buys us anything within the scientific
    enterprise.

    -- Mark

    Mark P. Line
    Polymathix
    San Antonio, TX



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